This along with the beginning of two can be taken to be the relevant parts of
Wittgenstein's metaphysical view that he will use to support his picture theory
of language.
These sections concern Wittgenstein's view that the sensible, changing world
we perceive does not consist of substance but of facts. Proposition two begins
with a discussion of objects, form and substance.
This epistemic notion is further clarified by a discussion of objects or
things as metaphysical substances.
His use of 'composite' in 2.021 can be taken to mean a combination of form
and matter, in the Platonic sense.
The notion of a static unchanging Form and its identity with Substance
represents the metaphysical view that has come to be held as an assumption by
the vast majority of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato and
Aristotle, as it was something they agreed on. “…what is called a form or a
substance is not generated.”
(Z.8 1033b13) The
opposing view states that unalterable Form, does not exist, or at least if there
is such a thing, it contains an ever changing, relative substance in a constant
state of flux. Although this view was held by Greeks like Heraclitus, it has
existed only on the fringe of the Western tradition since then. It is commonly
known now only in "Eastern" metaphysical views where the primary concept of
substance is Qi, or something similar, which persists through and beyond any
given Form. The former view is shown to be held by Wittgenstein in what
follows...
Although Wittgenstein largely disregarded Aristotle (Ray Monk's biography
suggests that he never read Aristotle at all) it seems that they shared some
anti-Platonist views on the universal/particular issue regarding primary
substances. He attacks universals explicitly in his Blue Book. "The idea of a
general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up
with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is
comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have
the properties; e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as
alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty,
unadulterated by anything that is beautiful."
And Aristotle agrees... "The universal cannot be a substance in the manner in
which an essence is…"
(Z.13 1038b17) as
he begins to draw the line and drift away from the concepts of universal Forms
held by his teacher Plato.
The concept of Essence, taken alone is a potentiality, and its combination
with matter is its actuality. “First, the substance of a thing is peculiar to it
and does not belong to any other thing.”
(Z.13 1038b10),
i.e. not universal and we know this is essence. This concept of
form/substance/essence, which we've now collapsed into one, being presented as
potential is also held by Wittgenstein, apparently...
Here ends what Wittgenstein deems to be the relevant points of his
metaphysical view and he begins in 2.1 to use said view to support his Picture
Theory of Language. "The Tractatus's notion of substance is the modal analogue
of Kant's temporal notion. Whereas for Kant, substance is that which “persists,”
(i.e., exists at all times), for Wittgenstein it is that which, figuratively
speaking, “persists” through a “space” of possible worlds."
Whether the
Aristotelian notions of substance came to Wittgenstein via Immanuel Kant or
Bertrand Russell or even arrived at intuitively, one cannot but see them.
The further thesis of 2. & 3. and their subsidiary propositions is
Wittgenstein’s
of language. This can be summed up as
follows:
The 4s are significant as they contain some of Wittgenstein's most explicit
statements concerning the nature of philosophy and the distinction between what
can be said and what can only be shown. It is here, for instance, that he first
distinguishes between material and grammatical propositions, noting:
4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give
any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are
nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from
our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same
class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the
beautiful.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact
not problems at all.
A philosophical treatise attempts to
say something where nothing can
properly be said. It is predicated upon the idea that philosophy should be
pursued in a way analogous to the natural sciences; that philosophers are
looking to construct true theories. This sense of philosophy does not coincide
with Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.
4.1 Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of
states of affairs.
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of
natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences).
4.111
Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean
something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside
them.)
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work
consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in
"philosophical propositions", but rather in the clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is
to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.
...
4.113 Philosophy
sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science.
4.114 It must set
limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It
must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can
be thought.
4.115 It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly
what can be said.
Wittgenstein is to be credited with the invention or at least the
popularization of
truth tables (4.31) and
truth conditions
(4.431) which now constitute the standard
semantic analysis of first-order sentential logic.
[8][9] The philosophical
significance of such a method for Wittgenstein was that it alleviated a
confusion, namely the idea that logical inferences are justified by rules. If an
argument form is valid, the conjunction of the premises will be
logically
equivalent to the conclusion and this can be clearly seen in a truth table;
it is
displayed. The concept of
tautology is thus central to Wittgenstein's
Tractarian account of
logical consequence, which is strictly
deductive.
5.13 When the truth of one proposition follows from the truth
of others, we can see this from the structure of the propositions.
5.131 If
the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds
expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one
another: nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them, by
combining them with one another in a single proposition; on the contrary, the
relations are internal, and their existence is an immediate result of the
existence of the propositions.
...
5.132 If p follows from q, I can make
an inference from q to p, deduce p from q. The nature of the inference can be
gathered only from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible
justification of the inference. "Laws of inference", which are supposed to
justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and
would be superfluous.
Proposition 6.*
In the beginning of 6. Wittgenstein postulates the essential form of all
sentences. He uses the notation
![[\bar p,\bar\xi, N(\bar\xi)]](http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/0/1/a/01a3cf5f91211db95ef402b4bd20508b.png)
,
where
stands for all atomic propositions,
stands for any subset of propositions, and
stands for the negation of all propositions making up .
What proposition 6. really says is that any logical sentence can be derived
from a series of
nand
operations on the totality of atomic propositions. This is in fact a well-known
logical
theorem produced by
Henry M. Sheffer, of
which Wittgenstein makes use. Sheffer's result was, however, restricted to the
propositional calculus, and so, of limited significance. Wittgenstein's
N-operator is however an infinitary analogue of the
Sheffer stroke, which applied to a set of
propositions produces a proposition that is equivalent to the denial of every
member of that set. Wittgenstein shows that this operator can cope with the
whole of predicate logic with identity, defining the quantifiers at 5.52, and
showing how identity would then be handled at 5.53-5.532.
The subsidiaries of 6. contain more philosophical reflections on logic,
connecting to ideas of knowledge, thought, and the
a priori and
transcendental. The final passages
argue that logic and mathematics express only tautologies and are
transcendental, i.e. they lie outside of the metaphysical subject’s world. In
turn, a logically "ideal" language cannot supply meaning, it can only reflect
the world, and so, sentences in a logical language cannot remain meaningful if
they are not merely reflections of the facts.
In the final pages Wittgenstein veers towards what might be seen as religious
considerations. This is founded on the gap between propositions 6.5 and 6.4. A
logical positivist might accept the propositions of
Tractatus before 6.4.
But 6.51 and the succeeding propositions argue that
ethics is also transcendental, and thus we cannot
examine it with language, as it is a form of
aesthetics and cannot be expressed. He begins
talking of the will, life after death, and God. In his examination of these
issues he argues that all discussion of them is a misuse of logic. Specifically,
since logical language can only reflect the world, any discussion of the
mystical, that
which lies outside of the metaphysical subject's world, is meaningless. This
suggests that many of the traditional domains of philosophy, e.g. ethics and
metaphysics, cannot in fact be discussed meaningfully. Any attempt to discuss
them immediately loses all sense. This also suggests that his own project of
trying to explain language is impossible for exactly these reasons. He suggests
that the project of philosophy must ultimately be abandoned for those logical
practices which attempt to reflect the world, not what is outside of it. The
natural sciences are just such a practice, he suggests.
At the very end of the text he borrows an analogy from
Arthur
Schopenhauer, and compares the book to a ladder that must be thrown away
after one has climbed it.
Proposition 7
As the last line in the book, proposition 7 has no supplementary
propositions. It ends the book with a rather elegant and stirring proposition:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (
„Wovon man nicht
sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.“)
Both the first and the final proposition have acquired something of a
proverbial quality in German, employed as
aphorisms independently of discussion of
Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein's conclusion in Proposition 7 echoes the
Old Testament words of
Jesus
ben Sirach (ישוע בן סירא,
Yešwaʿ ven Siraʾ):
What is too sublime
for you, do not seek; do not reach into things that are hidden from you. What is
committed to you, pay heed to; what is hidden is not your concern. (
Sirach 3: 21-22). Saint
Thomas Aquinas addressed
ben Sirach--and, by extension, Wittgenstein--in the First Article, First Part,
of his
Summa
Theologica:
I answer that, it was necessary for man's salvation that
there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built
up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an
end that surpasses the grasp of his reason:
The eye hath not seen, O God,
besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee (
Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be
known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it
was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human
reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those
truths about God such as reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man
should be taught by a divine revaluation; because the truth about God such as
reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time,
and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas as man's whole salvation, which
is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that
the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was
necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was
therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason there
should be a sacred science learned through revelation.
[10]
Following Aquinas, moral philosophers and theologians have addressed the
problem of religious language for
centuries. Moreover, there has been extensive commentary on the relationship
between the respective treatises of Wittgenstein (
Tractatus) and Aquinas
(
Summa Theologica).
[11][12] In addition,
Fergus Gordon
Kerr, a
Roman Catholic priest of the
Order of Preachers founded by
Saint Dominic, notes that
"theological questions lie between the lines of all of Wittgenstein's writing.
It is hard to think of a great philosopher, at least since Nietzsche, whose work
is equally pervaded by theological considerations."
[13]
The Picture Theory
A prominent view set out in the
Tractatus is the picture theory. The
picture theory is a proposed description of the relation of representation.
[14] This
view is sometimes called the
picture theory of language, but
Wittgenstein discusses various representational picturing relationships,
including non-linguistic "pictures" such as photographs and sculptures (TLP
2.1–2.225).
[14]
According to the theory, propositions can "picture" the world, and thus
accurately represent it.
[14] If
someone thinks the proposition, "There is a tree in the yard," then that
proposition accurately pictures the world if and only if there is a tree in the
yard.
[15] If
there is no tree in the yard, the proposition does not accurately picture the
world. Although something need not be a proposition to represent something in
the world, Wittgenstein was largely concerned with the way propositions function
as representations.
[14]
Wittgenstein was inspired for this theory by the way that traffic courts in
Paris reenact automobile accidents.
[16] A toy
car is a representation of a real car, a toy truck is a representation of a real
truck, and dolls are representations of people. In order to convey to a judge
what happened in an automobile accident, someone in the courtroom might place
the toy cars in a position like the position the real cars were in, and move
them in the ways that the real cars moved. In this way, the elements of the
picture (the toy cars) are in spatial relation to one another, and this relation
itself pictures the spatial relation between the real cars in the automobile
accident.
[17]
When writing about these picturing situations, Wittgenstein used the word
"
Bild," which may be translated as "picture" or "model". Although the
theory is commonly known as the "picture" theory, "model" is probably a more
appropriate way of thinking of what Wittgenstein meant by "
Bild."
[16]
Pictures have what Wittgenstein calls
Form der Abbildung, or pictorial
form, in virtue of their being similar to what they picture. The fact that the
toy car has four wheels, for example, is part of its pictorial form, because the
real car had four wheels. The fact that the toy car is significantly smaller
than the real car is part of its representational form, or the differences
between the picture and what it pictures, which Wittgenstein is interpreted to
mean by
Form der Darstellung.
[18]
This picturing relationship, Wittgenstein believed, was our key to
understanding the relationship a proposition holds to the world.
[14] We can't
see a proposition like we can a toy car, yet he believed a proposition
must still have a pictorial form.
[19]
The pictorial form of a proposition is best captured in the pictorial form of
a thought, as thoughts consist only of pictorial form. This pictorial form is
logical structure.
[20]
Wittgenstein believed that the parts of the logical structure of thought must
somehow correspond to words as parts of the logical structure of propositions,
although he did not know exactly how.
[21] Here, Wittgenstein
ran into a problem he acknowledged widely: we cannot think about a picture
outside of its representational form.
[20] Recall
that part of the representational form of toy cars is their size—specifically,
the fact that they are necessarily smaller than the actual cars.
[18] Just
so, a picture cannot express its own pictorial form.
[20]
One outcome of the picture theory is that
a priori truth does not
exist. Truth comes from the accurate representation of a state of affairs (i.e.,
some aspect of the real world) by a picture (i.e., a proposition). "The totality
of true thoughts is a picture of the world (TLP 3.01)." Thus without holding a
proposition up against the real world, we cannot tell whether the proposition is
true or false.
[20]
Logical Atomism
Although Wittgenstein did not use the term himself, his metaphysical view
throughout the
Tractatus is commonly referred to as logical atomism.
While his logical atomism resembles that of
Bertrand Russell, the two views are not
strictly the same.
[22]
Russell's
theory of descriptions is a way of
logically analyzing objects in a meaningful way regardless of that object's
existence. According to the theory, a statement like "There is a man to my left"
is made meaningful by analyzing it into: "There is some
x such that
x is a man and
x is to my left, and for any
y, if
y
is a man and
y is to my left,
y is identical to
x". If the
statement is true,
x refers to the man to my left.
[23]
Whereas Russell believed the names (like
x) in his theory should refer
to things we can know epistemically, Wittgenstein thought they should refer to
the "objects" that make up his metaphysics.
[24]
By
objects, Wittgenstein did not mean physical objects in the world,
but the absolute base of logical analysis, that can be combined but not divided
(TLP 2.02–2.0201).
[22]
According to Wittgenstein's logical-atomistic metaphysical system, objects each
have a "nature," which is their capacity to combine with other objects. When
combined, objects form "states of affairs." A state of affairs that obtains is a
"fact." Facts make up the entirety of the world. Facts are logically independent
of one another, as are states of affairs. That is, one state of affair's (or
fact's) existence does not allow us to infer whether another state of affairs
(or fact) exists or does not exist.
[25]
Within states of affairs, objects are in particular relations to one
another.
[26] This is
analogous to the spatial relations between toy cars discussed above. The
structure of states of affairs comes from the arrangement of their constituent
objects (TLP 2.032), and such arrangement is essential to their intelligibility,
just as the toy cars must be arranged in a certain way in order to picture the
automobile accident.
[26]
A fact might be thought of as the obtaining state of affairs that Madison is
in Wisconsin, and a possible (but not obtaining) state of affairs might be
Madison's being in Utah. These states of affairs are made up of certain
arrangements of objects (TLP 2.023). However, Wittgenstein does not specify what
objects are. Madison, Wisconsin, and Utah cannot be atomic objects: they are
themselves composed of numerous facts.
[26]
Instead, Wittgenstein believed objects to be the things in the world that would
correlate to the smallest parts of a logically analyzed language, such as names
like
x. Our language is not sufficiently (i.e., not completely) analyzed
for such a correlation, so one cannot
say what an object is.
[27] We can,
however, talk about them as "indestructible" and "common to all possible
worlds."
[26]
Wittgenstein believed that the philosopher's job was to discover the structure
of language through analysis.
[28]
Anthony Kenny
provides a useful analogy for understanding Wittgenstein's logical atomism: a
slightly modified game of
chess.
[29] Just like objects
in states of affairs, the chess pieces do not alone constitute the game—their
arrangements, together with the pieces (objects) themselves, determine the state
of affairs.
[27]
Through Kenny's chess analogy, we can see the relationship between
Wittgenstein's logical atomism and his picture theory of representation.
[30] For the
sake of this analogy, the chess pieces are objects, they and their positions
constitute states of affairs and therefore facts, and the totality of facts is
the entire particular game of chess.
[27]
We can communicate such a game of chess in the exact way that Wittgenstein
says a proposition represents the world.
[30] We
might say "WR/KR1" to communicate a white rook's being on the square commonly
labeled as king's rook 1. Or, to be more thorough, we might make such a report
for every piece's position.
[30]
The logical form of our reports must be the same logical form of the chess
pieces and their arrangement on the board in order to be meaningful. Our
communication about the chess game must have as many possibilities for
constituents and their arrangement as the game itself.
[30] Kenny
points out that such logical form need not strictly resemble the chess game. The
logical form can be had by the bouncing of a ball (for example, twenty bounces
might communicate a white rook's being on the king's rook 1 square). One can
bounce a ball as many times as one wishes, which means the ball's bouncing has
"logical multiplicity," and can therefore share the logical form of the
game.
[31] A motionless ball
cannot communicate this same information, as it does not have logical
multiplicity.
[30]
The Saying/Showing
Distinction
According to the picture theory, when a proposition is thought or expressed,
each of its constituent parts correspond (if the proposition is true) to some
aspect of the world. However, the correspondence itself is something
Wittgenstein believed we could not
say anything about. We can say
that there is correspondence, but the correspondence itself can only be
shown.
[32]
His logical-atomistic metaphysical view led Wittgenstein to believe that we
could not
say anything about the relationship that pictures bear to what
they picture. Thus the picture theory allows us to be
shown that some
things can be
said while others are
shown.
[33] Our language is
not sufficient for expressing its own logical structure.
[34] Wittgenstein
believed that the philosopher's job was to discover the structure of language
through analysis.
[28]
Something
sayable must have content that is fully intelligible to a
person without that person's knowing if it is true or false.
[15] In the
case of something's inability to be said, such as the logical structure of
language, it can only be
shown.
[20] A
proposition can
say something, such as "George is tall," but it cannot
express (
say) this function of itself. It can only
show that it
says that George is tall.
[15]
Reception and
influence
Wittgenstein concluded that with the
Tractatus he had resolved all
philosophical problems.
Meanwhile, the book was translated into
English by
C. K. Ogden with help from the
Cambridge mathematician and
philosopher Frank P. Ramsey, then
still in his teens. Ramsey later visited Wittgenstein in Austria. Translation
issues make the concepts hard to pinpoint, especially given Wittgenstein's usage
of terms and difficulty in translating ideas into words.
[35]
The
Tractatus caught the attention of the philosophers of the
Vienna Circle (1921–1933),
especially
Rudolf Carnap
and
Moritz Schlick.
The group spent many months working through the text out loud, line by line.
Schlick eventually convinced Wittgenstein to meet with members of the circle to
discuss the
Tractatus when he returned to Vienna (he was then working as
an architect). Although the Vienna Circle's logical positivists appreciated the
Tractatus, they argued that the last few passages, including Proposition
7, are confused. Carnap hailed the book as containing important insights, but
encouraged people to ignore the concluding sentences. Wittgenstein responded to
Schlick, commenting, "...I cannot imagine that Carnap should have so completely
misunderstood the last sentences of the book and hence the fundamental
conception of the entire book."
[36]
A more recent interpretation comes from the
New Wittgenstein family of interpretations
(2000-).
[37] This so-called "resolute reading" is controversial
and much debated.[citation
needed] The main contention of such readings is that
Wittgenstein in the
Tractatus does not provide a theoretical account of
language that relegates ethics and philosophy to a mystical realm of the
unsayable. Rather, the book has a therapeutic aim. By working through the
propositions of the book the reader comes to realize that language is perfectly
suited to all his needs, and that philosophy rests on a confused relation to the
logic of our language. The confusion that the
Tractatus seeks to dispel
is not a confused theory, such that a correct theory would be a proper way to
clear the confusion, rather the need of any such theory is confused. The method
of the
Tractatus is to make the reader aware of the logic of our language
as he is already familiar with it, and the effect of thereby dispelling the need
for a theoretical account of the logic of our language spreads to all other
areas of philosophy. Thereby the confusion involved in putting forward e.g.
ethical and metaphysical theories is cleared in the same
coup.
Wittgenstein would not meet the Vienna Circle proper, but only a few of its
members, including Schlick, Carnap, and Waissman. Often, though, he refused to
discuss philosophy, and would insist on giving the meetings over to reciting the
poetry of
Rabindranath Tagore with his chair turned
to the wall. He largely broke off formal relations even with these members of
the circle after coming to believe Carnap had used some of his ideas without
permission.
[38]
The
Tractatus was the theme of a 1992 film by the Hungarian filmmaker
Peter
Forgacs. The 32-minute production, named
Wittgenstein
Tractatus, features citations from the
Tractatus and other works
by Wittgenstein.
Editions
Tractatus is the English translation of
- Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, Wilhelm Ostwald (ed.), Annalen der
Naturphilosophie, 14 (1921)
A notable German Edition of the works of Wittgenstein is:
- Werkausgabe (Vol. 1 includes Tractatus). Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag.
Both English translations of
Tractatus include an introduction by
Bertrand Russell.
Wittgenstein revised the Ogden translation.
[39]
- C. K. Ogden (1922), prepared with assistance from G. E. Moore, F. P. Ramsey, and
Wittgenstein. Routledge & Kegan Paul, parallel edition including the German
text on the facing page to the English text: 1981 printing: ISBN 0-415-05186-X, 1999 Dover
reprint
- David Pears and Brian
McGuinness (1961), Routledge, hardcover: ISBN 0-7100-3004-5, 1974
paperback: ISBN 0-415-02825-6, 2001
hardcover: ISBN 0-415-25562-7, 2001
paperback: ISBN 0-415-25408-6
A manuscript version of
Tractatus, dubbed and published as the
Prototractatus, was discovered in 1965 by
Georg
Henrik von Wright.
[39]
Notes
- ^ TLP
4.113
- ^ Nils-Eric Sahlin,
The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey (1990), p. 227.
- ^ Monk
p.158
- ^ Bertrand Russell
(1918), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism". The Monist. p. 177, as
published, for example in Bertrand
Russell (Robert Charles Marsh ed.) Logic and Knowledge Accessed
2010-01-29.
- ^ a b c Aristotle's Metaphysics: © 1979 by H.G. Apostle Peripatetic
Press. Des Moines, Iowa. Online translation: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.7.vii.html
- ^ "Blue Book on
Universals citation". Blacksacademy.net. http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/2975.html. Retrieved 2011-12-10.
- ^ "Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-atomism/#1. Retrieved 2011-12-10.
- ^ Grayling, A.C.
Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford
- ^ Kneale, M. & Kneale,
W. (1962), The Development of Logic
- ^ "Summa
Theologia". Christian Classics Ethereal Library. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q1_A1.html. Retrieved 14MAY12. "See the First Part,
Question 1, Article 1."
- ^ Stout, Jeremy & McSwain, Robert; Editors (2004), Grammar
and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein, London: SCM
Press, pp. xvi + 286, ISBN 0-334-02923-6, "This book is
a collection of essays on Aquinas and Wittgenstein written by some of the
leading theologians and philosophers of religion in the English-speaking
world."
- ^ Hallett,
Garth L.; Society of
Jesus (2004), Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith:
Late-Wittgensteinian Perspectives, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, pp. ix + 211, ISBN 0-754-65034-0, "This book
presents the first sustained study of the identities that run through the heart
of Christian faith and theology: the identity of Jesus with God, of each of the
three divine persons with God, of the Eucharist with the body and blood of
Christ, of present teaching with traditional teaching and of traditional
teaching with revelation, of the present church with the church of the Apostles,
of the risen Christ with the crucified Christ, and of the blessed with the
deceased. Resisting essentialism and stressing Wittgensteinian analogy, Hallett
makes due room for mystery. By locating rather than explaining the mystery he
throws new light on each of the identities studied."
- ^ Kerr, Fergus;
Order of Preachers (1986), Theology after
Wittgenstein, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. xii
+ 202, ISBN 0-631-14688-1, "The
philosopher Wittgenstein is considered by many to be the most influential and
significant of the 20th century. This book introduces him to students of
theology and focuses on his writings dealing with theological issues such as the
inner life, immortality of the soul, and the relationship of the believer to
church and tradition."
- ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005,
p. 44
- ^ a b c Kenny 2005,
p. 53
- ^ a b Stern 1995,
p. 35
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 45
- ^ a b Kenny 2005,
p. 46
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 47
- ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005,
p. 48
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 47 Might need an additional citation
here.
- ^ a b Kenny 2005,
p. 58
- ^ "Descriptions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)".
Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#RusTheDes. Retrieved 2011-12-10.
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 63
- ^ Kenny 2005, pp. 58–59
- ^ a b c d Kenny 2005,
p. 59
- ^ a b c Kenny 2005,
p. 60
- ^ a b Stern 1995,
p. 38
- ^ Kenny 2005, pp. 60–61
- ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005,
p. 61
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 62
- ^ Kenny 2005, p. 56
- ^ Stern 1995, p. 40
- ^ Stern 1995, p. 47
- ^ Richard H. Popkin (November
1985), "Philosophy and the History of Philosophy", Journal of
Philosophy 82 (11): 625–632, doi:10.2307/2026418, JSTOR 2026418, "Many who
knew Wittgenstein report that he found it extremely difficult to put his ideas
into words and that he had many special usages of terms."
- ^ Conant, James F.
"Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point
of View for Their Works as Authors", in Philosophy and the Grammar of
Religious Belief (1995), ed. Timothy Tessin and Marion von der Ruhr, St.
Martins Press, ISBN 0-312-12394-9
- ^ Crary, Alice M.
and Rupert Read (eds.). The New Wittgenstein, Routledge,
2000.
- ^ Hintikka 2000, p. 55 cites Wittgenstein's
accusation of Carnap upon receiving a 1932 preprint from Carnap.
- ^ a b R. W.
Newell (January 1973), "Reviewed Work(s): Prototractatus, an Early Version of
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", Philosophy 48 (183): 97–99,
ISSN 0031-8191, JSTOR 3749717.
References
- Hintikka, Jaakko (2000), On
Wittgenstein, ISBN 0-534-57594-3
- Kenny, Anthony (2005),
Wittgenstein, Williston, VT: Wiley-Blackwell .
- Stern, David G. (1995),
Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
- Ray Monk, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius, Jonathan Cape, 1990.
External links
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| 3.0321 Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can
be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry
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