Solar Deity

A solar deity (also sun god/dess) is a sky deity who represents the Sun, or an aspect of it, usually by its perceived power and strength. Solar deities and sun worship can be found throughout most of recorded history in various forms. Hence, many beliefs have formed around this worship, such as the "missing sun" found in many cultures.

Contents

• 1 Overview
  • 1.1 Africa
  • 1.2 Aztec mythology
  • 1.3 Buddhism
  • 1.4 Chinese mythology
  • 1.5 Christianity
  • 1.6 Ancient Egypt
  • 1.7 Hinduism
  • 1.8 Indonesian mythology
  • 1.9 Theosophy
• 2 Solar myth
• 3 Solar barge and sun chariot
• 4 Male and female
• 5 Missing sun
• 6 See also
• 7 References
• 8 Bibliography
• 9 External links

Overview

The Neolithic concept of a solar barge, the sun as traversing the sky in a boat, is found in the later myths of ancient Egypt, with Ra and Horus. Earlier Egyptian myths imply that the sun is within the lioness, Sekhmet, at night and can be seen reflected in her eyes or that it is within the cow, Hathor during the night, being reborn each morning as her son (bull).
Mesopotamian Shamash plays an important role during the Bronze Age, and "my Sun" is eventually used as an address to royalty. Similarly, South American cultures have a tradition of Sun worship, as with the Incan Inti. Svarog is the Slavic god sun and spirit of fire.
Proto-Indo-European religion has a solar chariot, the sun as traversing the sky in a chariot.^{[citation needed]} In Germanic mythology this is Sol, in Vedic Surya, and in Greek Helios (occasionally referred to as Titan) and (sometimes) as Apollo.
During the Roman Empire, a festival of the birth of the Unconquered Sun (or Dies Natalis Solis Invicti) was celebrated on the winter solstice—the "rebirth" of the sun—which occurred on December 25 of the Julian calendar. In late antiquity, the theological centrality of the sun in some Imperial religious systems suggest a form of a “solar monotheism.” The religious commemorations on December 25 were replaced under Christian domination of the Empire with the birthday of Christ.^[1]

Africa

The Tiv people consider the Sun to be the son of the supreme being Awondo and the Moon Awondo's daughter. The Barotse tribe believes that the Sun is inhabited by the sky god Nyambi and the Moon is his wife. Even where the sun god is equated with the supreme being, in some African mythologies he or she does not have any special functions or privileges as compared to other deities. The Ancient Egyptian god of creation, Amun is also believed to reside inside the sun. So is the Akan creator deity, Nyame and the Dogon deity of creation, Nommo.

Aztec mythology

In Aztec mythology, Tonatiuh (Nahuatl: Ollin Tonatiuh, "Movement of the Sun") was the sun god. The Aztec people considered him the leader of Tollan (heaven). He was also known as the fifth sun, because the Aztecs believed that he was the sun that took over when the fourth sun was expelled from the sky. According to their cosmology, each sun was a god with its own cosmic era. According to the Aztecs, they were still in Tonatiuh's era. According to the Aztec creation myth, the god demanded human sacrifice as tribute and without it would refuse to move through the sky. It is said that 20,000 people were sacrificed each year to Tonatiuh and other gods, though this number is thought to be inflated either by the Aztecs, who wanted to inspire fear in their enemies, or the Spaniards, who wanted to vilify the Aztecs. The Aztecs were fascinated by the sun and carefully observed it, and had a solar calendar similar to that of the Maya. Many of today's remaining Aztec monuments have structures aligned with the sun.^[2]
In the Aztec calendar, Tonatiuh is the lord of the thirteen days from 1 Death to 13 Flint. The preceding thirteen days are ruled over by Chalchiuhtlicue, and the following thirteen by Tlaloc.

Buddhism

In Buddhist cosmology, the bodhisattva of the Sun is known as Ri Gong Ri Guang Pu Sa (The Bright Solar Bodhisattva of the Solar Palace) / Ri Gong Ri Guang Tian Zi (The Bright Solar Prince of the Solar Palace) / Ri Gong Ri Guang Zun Tian Pu Sa (The Greatly Revered Bright Solar Prince of the Solar Palace / one of the 20 or 24 guardian devas). In Sanskrit, He is known as Suryaprabha. He is usually depicted with Yue Gong Yue Guang Pu Sa (The Bright Lunar Bodhisattva of the Lunar Palace) / Yue Gong Yue Guang Tian Zi ( The Bright Lunar Prince of the Lunar Palace) / Yue Gong Yue Guang Zun Tian Pu Sa (The Greatly Revered Bright Lunar Prince of the Lunar Palace / one of the 20 or 24 guardian devas known as Candraprabha in Sanskrit. With Yao Shi Fo / Bhaisajyaguru Buddha (Medicine Buddha), these two bodhisattvas create the Dong Fang San Sheng or the Three Holy Sages of the East.

Chinese mythology

In Chinese mythology (cosmology), there were originally ten suns in the sky, who were all brothers. They were supposed to emerge one at a time as commanded by the Jade Emperor. They were all very young and loved to fool around. Once they decided to all go into the sky to play, all at once. This made the world too hot for anything to grow. A hero named Hou Yi shot down nine of them with a bow and arrow to save the people of the earth. He is still honored this very day. In another myth, the solar eclipse was caused by the magical dog of heaven biting off a piece of the sun. The referenced event is said to have occurred around 2,160BCE. There was a tradition in China to make lots of loud celebratory sounds during a solar eclipse to scare the sacred "dog" away. The Deity of the Sun in Chinese mythology is Ri Gong Tai Yang Xing Jun (Tai Yang Gong / Grandfather Sun) or Star Lord of the Solar Palace, Lord of the Sun. In some mythologies, Tai Yang Xing Jun is believed to be Hou Yi. Tai Yang Xing Jun is usually depicted with the Star Lord of the Lunar Palace, Lord of the Moon, Yue Gong Tai Yin Xing Jun (Tai Yin Niang Niang / Lady Tai Yin).

Christianity

See also: Sol Invictus and Jesus Christ in comparative mythology

Christ is associated with the Sun through Christmas, which occurs at the time of the Winter solstice. Many astro-theologians point out a connection between many of the supposed events in the New Testament to the phenomena of the sun which makes the biblical Jesus more of a solar riddle.

Ancient Egypt

Sun worship was prevalent in ancient Egyptian religion. The earliest deities associated with the sun are all goddesses: Wadjet, Sekhmet, Hathor, Nut, Bast, Bat, and Menhit. First Hathor, and then Isis, give birth to and nurse Horus and Ra. Hathor the horned-cow is one of the 12 daughters of Ra, gifted with joy and is a wet-nurse to Horus.
The Sun's movement across the sky represents a struggle between the Pharaoh's soul and an avatar of Osiris. Ra travels across the sky in his solar-boat; at dawn he drives away the demon Apep of darkness. The "solarisation" of several local gods (Hnum-Re, Min-Re, Amon-Re) reaches its peak in the period of the fifth dynasty.
Rituals to the god Amun who became identified with the sun god Ra were often carried out on the top of temple pylons. A Pylon mirrored the hieroglyph for 'horizon' or akhet, which was a depiction of two hills "between which the sun rose and set",^[3] associated with recreation and rebirth. On the first Pylon of the temple of Isis at Philae, the pharaoh is shown slaying his enemies in the presence of Isis, Horus and Hathor. In the eighteenth dynasty, Akhenaten changed the polytheistic religion of Egypt to a monotheistic one, Atenism of the solar-disk and is the first recorded state monotheism. All other deities were replaced by the Aten, including Amun-Ra, the reigning sun god of Akhenaten's own region. Unlike other deities, the Aten did not have multiple forms. His only image was a disk—a symbol of the sun.
Soon after Akhenaten's death, worship of the traditional deities was reestablished by the religious leaders (Ay the High-Priest of Amen-Ra, mentor of Tutankhaten/Tutankhamen) who had adopted the Aten during the reign of Akhenaten.

Hinduism

The Ādityas are one of the principal deities of the Vedic classical Hinduism belonging to Solar class. In the Vedas, numerous hymns are dedicated to Mitra, Varuna, Savitr etc.
Even the Gayatri mantra, which is regarded as one of the most sacred of the Vedic hymns is dedicated to Savitr, one of the principal Ādityas. The Adityas are a group of solar deities, from the Brahmana period numbering twelve. The ritual of sandhyavandanam, performed by Hindus, is an elaborate set of hand gestures and body movements, designed to greet and revere the Sun.
The sun god in Hinduism is an ancient and revered deity. In later Hindu usage, all the Vedic Ādityas lost identity and metamorphosed into one composite deity, Surya, the Sun. The attributes of all other Ādityas merged into that of Surya and the names of all other Ādityas became synonymous with, or epithets of, Surya.
The Ramayana has Rama as a descendant of the Surya, thus belonging to the Suryavansha or the clan of the Sun. The Mahabharata describes one of its warrior heroes, Karna, as being the son of the Pandava mother Kunti and Surya.
The sun god is said to be married to the goddess Ranaadeh, also known as Sanjnya. She is depicted in dual form, being both sunlight and shadow, personified. The goddess is revered in Gujarat and Rajasthan.
The charioteer of Surya is Aruna, who is also personified as the redness that accompanies the sunlight in dawn and dusk. The sun god is driven by a seven-horsed Chariot depicting the seven days of the week.
In India, at Konark, in the state of Odisha, a temple is dedicated to Surya. The Konark Sun Temple has been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Surya is the most prominent of the navagrahas or nine celestial objects of the Hindus. Navagrahas can be found in almost all Hindu temples. There are further temples dedicated to Surya, one in Arasavilli, Srikakulam District in AndhraPradesh, one in Gujarat at Modhera and another in Rajasthan. The temple at Arasavilli was constructed in such a way that on the day of Radhasaptami, the sun's rays directly fall on the feet of the Sri Suryanarayana Swami, the deity at the temple.
Chhath (Hindi: छठ, also called Dala Chhath) is an ancient Hindu festival dedicated to Surya, the chief solar deity, unique to Bihar, Jharkhand and the Terai. This major festival is also celebrated in the northeast region of India, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and parts of Chhattisgarh. Hymns to the sun can be found in the Vedas, the oldest sacred texts of Hinduism. Practiced in different parts of India, the worship of the sun has been described in the Rigveda. There is another festival called Sambha-Dasami, which is celebrated in the state of Odisha for the surya.
The Gurjars (or Gujjars), were Sun-worshipers and are described as devoted to the feet of the sun god Surya. Their copper-plate grants bear an emblem of the Sun and on their seals too, this symbol is depicted.^[4]

Indonesian mythology

Solar gods have a stronger presence in Indonesian mythology. In some cases the Sun is revered as a "father" or "founder" of the tribe. This may apply for the whole tribe or only for the royal and ruling families. This practise is more common in Australia and on the island of Timor, where the tribal leaders are seen as direct heirs to the sun god.
Some of the initiation rites include the second reincarnation of the rite's subject as a "son of the Sun", through a symbolic death and a rebirth in the form of a Sun. These rituals hint that the Sun may have an important role in the sphere of funerary beliefs. Watching the Sun's path has given birth to the idea in some societies that the deity of the Sun descends in to the underworld without dying and is capable of returning afterward. This is the reason for the Sun being associated with functions such as guide of the deceased tribe members to the underworld, as well as with revival of perished. The Sun is a mediator between the planes of the living and the dead.

Theosophy

Main article: Spiritual Hierarchy#Cosmic beings functioning within the Sun

The primary local deity in Theosophy is the Solar Logos, "the consciousness of the sun".^[5]

Solar myth

Three theories exercised great influence on nineteenth and early twentieth century mythography, beside the Tree worship of Mannhardt and the Totemism of J. F. McLennan, the "Sun myth" of Alvin Boyd Kuhn and Max Müller.
R. F. Littledale criticized the Sun myth theory when he illustrated that Max Müller on his own principles was himself only a Solar myth, whilst Alfred Lyall delivered a still stronger attack on the same theory and its assumption that tribal gods and heroes, such as those of Homer, were mere reflections of the Sun myth by proving that the gods of certain Rajput clans were really warriors who founded the clans not many centuries ago, and were the ancestors of the present chieftains.^[6]

Solar barge and sun chariot

A "solar barge" (also "solar bark", "solar barque", "solar boat" and "sun boat") is a mythological representation of the sun riding in a boat. The "Khufu ship", a 43.6-meter-long vessel that was sealed into a pit in the Giza pyramid complex at the foot of the Great Pyramid of Giza around 2500 BC, is a full-size surviving example which may have fulfilled the symbolic function of a solar barque. This boat was rediscovered in May 1954 when archeologist Kamal el-Mallakh and inspector Zaki Nur found two ditches sealed off by about 40 blocks weighing 17 to 20 tonnes each. This boat was disassembled into 1,224 pieces and took over 10 years to reassemble. A nearby museum was built to house this boat.^[7]
Other sun boats were found in Egypt dating to different pharonic dynasties.^[8]
Examples include:

• Neolithic petroglyphs which (it has been speculated) show solar barges
• The many early Egyptian goddesses who are related as sun deities and the later gods Ra and Horus depicted as riding in a solar barge. In Egyptian myths of the afterlife, Ra rides in an underground channel from west to east every night so that he can rise in the east the next morning.
• The Nebra sky disk, which is thought to show a depiction of a solar barge.
• Nordic Bronze Age petroglyphs, including those found in Tanumshede often contains barges and sun crosses in different constellations.

A "sun chariot" is a mythological representation of the sun riding in a chariot. The concept is younger than that of the solar barge, and typically Indo-European, corresponding with the Indo-European expansion after the invention of the chariot in the 2nd millennium BC.
Examples include:

• In Norse mythology, the chariot of the goddess Sól, drawn by Arvak and Alsvid. The Trundholm sun chariot dates to the Nordic Bronze Age, more than 2,500 years earlier than the Norse myth, but is often associated with it.
• Greek Helios riding in a chariot,^[9] (see also Phaëton)^[10]
• Sol Invictus depicted riding a quadriga on the reverse of a Roman coin.^[11]
• Vedic Surya riding in a chariot drawn by seven horses

The sun itself also was compared to a wheel, possibly in Proto-Indo-European, Greek hēliou kuklos, Sanskrit suryasya cakram, Anglo-Saxon sunnan hweogul (PIE *swelyosyo kukwelos).

Male and female

Among modern English speakers, solar deities are popularly thought of as male counterparts of the lunar deity (usually female); however, sun goddesses are found on every continent (e.g. Amaterasu in Japanese belief) paired with male lunar deities. Among the earliest records of human beliefs, the early goddesses of the Egyptian pantheon carried a sun above their head as a symbol of dignity (as daughters of Ra). The sun was a major aspect of Egyptian symbols and hieroglyphs, all the lunar deities of that pantheon were male deities. The cobra (of Pharaoh Son of Ra), the lioness (daughter of Ra), the cow (daughter of Ra), the dominant symbols of the most ancient Egyptian deities, carried their relationship to the sun atop their heads; they were female and their cults remained active throughout the history of the culture. Later a sun god (Aten) was established in the eighteenth dynasty on top of the other solar deities, before the "aberration" was stamped out and the old pantheon re-established. When male deities became associated with the sun in that culture, they began as the offspring of a mother (except Ra, King of the Gods who gave birth to himself).
Some mythologists, such as Brian Branston, Patricia Monaghan and Janet McCrickard, contend that sun goddesses are as common as, or even more common, worldwide than their male counterparts. They also claim that the belief that solar deities are primarily male is linked to the fact that a few better known mythologies (such as those of late classical Greece and late Roman mythology) rarely break from this rule, although closer examination of the earlier myths of those cultures reveal a very different distribution than the contemporary popular belief. The dualism of sun/male/light and moon/female/darkness is found in many (but not all) late southern traditions in Europe that derive from Orphic and Gnostic philosophies.
In Germanic mythology the Sun is female and the Moon is male. The corresponding Old English name is Siȝel [ˈsɪjel], continuing Proto-Germanic *Sôwilô or *Saewelô. The Old High German Sun goddess is Sunna. In the Norse traditions, every day, Sól rode through the sky on her chariot, pulled by two horses named Arvak and Alsvid. Sól also was called Sunna and Frau Sunne, from which are derived the words: Sun and Sunday.
Other cultures that have sun goddesses include: The Lithuanians and Latvians (Saule), the Finns (Päivätär, Beiwe) and the related Hungarians (Xatel-Ekwa) and the Slavic peoples (Solntse). Sun goddesses are found around the world; in Arabia (Al-Lat), Australia (Bila, Walo), India (Bisal-Mariamna, Bomong, Kn Sgni) and Sri Lanka (Pattini); among the Hittites (Wurusemu), Egyptians (Sekhmet) and Babylonians (Shapash); in Native America, among the Cherokee (Unelanuhi), Natchez (Wal Sil), Inuit (Malina) and Miwok (Hekoolas).

Missing sun

The missing sun is a theme in the myths of many cultures,^{[citation needed]} sometimes including the themes of imprisonment, exile, or death. The missing sun is often used to explain various natural phenomena, including the disappearance of the sun at night, shorter days during the winter, and solar eclipses.
Some other tales are similar, such as the Sumerian story of the goddess Inanna's descent into the underworld. These may have parallel themes, but do not fit in this motif unless they concern a solar deity.
In late Egyptian mythology, Ra passes through Duat (the underworld) every night. Apep has to be defeated in the darkness hours for Ra and his solar barge to emerge in the east each morning.
In Japanese mythology, the sun goddess Amaterasu is startled by the behavior of her brother Susanoo and hides in a cave, plunging the world into darkness until she is willing to emerge. It has been suggested that the story is allegorical, symbolising that the sun goddess hiding in a cave is a metaphor for the sun exhibiting quiet periods such as the Maunder Minimum. This allegory has been used in literature such as Masks of the Lost Kings.^[12]
In Norse mythology, the gods Odin and Tyr both have attributes of a sky father, and they are doomed to be devoured by wolves (Fenrir and Garm, respectively) at Ragnarok. Sól, the Norse sun goddess, will be devoured by the wolf Skoll.
In Hindu astronomy, Rahu and Ketu ate the sun or moon to cause lunars and solar eclipses. In later, more scientific years, their names were given to the Lunar nodes.

See also

• Abram Smythe Palmer
• Ame-no-Uzume-no-Mikoto
• Beaivi
• Belenos
• Black Sun (deity)
• Black Sun (disambiguation)
• Canticle of the Sun
• Fire worship
• Five Suns
• Giza Solar boat museum
• Guaraci
• Golden hat
• Heliocentrism
• July Morning
• Konark Sun Temple
• List of solar deities
• Lunar deity
• Nature worship
• Order of the Solar Temple
• Phoenix
• Solar calendar
• Solar symbol
• Stonehenge
• Thelema
• White horse (mythology)
• Winged sun

References

1. ^ "Sun worship." Encyclopædia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009
2. ^ Biblioteca Porrúa. Imprenta del Museo Nacional de Arqueología, Historia y Etnología, ed. (1905). Diccionario de Mitología Nahua (in Spanish). México. pp. 648, 649, 650. ISBN 978-9684327955. 
3. ^ Wilkinson, op. cit., p.195
4. ^ Lālatā Prasāda Pāṇḍeya (1971). Sun-worship in ancient India. Motilal Banarasidass. p. 245. 
5. ^ Powell, A.E. The Solar System London:1930 The Theosophical Publishing House (A Complete Outline of the Theosophical Scheme of Evolution). Lucifer, represented by the sun, the light.
6. ^ William Ridgeway (Cambridge: 1915). "Solar Myths, Tree Spirits, and Totems, The Dramas and Dramatic Dances of Non-European Races". Cambridge University Press. TheatreHistory.com. pp. 11–19. Retrieved 18 September 2010. 
7. ^ Siliotti, Alberto, Zahi Hawass, 1997 "Guide to the Pyramids of Egypt" p. 54-55
8. ^ "Egypt solar boats". 
9. ^ "Helios". Theoi.com. Retrieved 22 September 2010. 
10. ^ "Helios & Phaethon". Thanasis.com. Retrieved 18 September 2010. 
11. ^ Probus Coin
12. ^ http://www.tombane.com

Bibliography

• Azize, Joseph (2005) The Phoenician Solar Theology. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press. ISBN 1-59333-210-6.
• Olcott, William Tyler (1914/2003) Sun Lore of All Ages: A Collection of Myths and Legends Concerning the Sun and Its Worship Adamant Media Corporation. ISBN 0-543-96027-7.
• Hawkins, Jacqueta Man and the Sun Gaithersburg, MD, USA:1962 SolPub Co.
• McCrickard, Janet. "Eclipse of the Sun: An Investigation into Sun and Moon Myths." Gothic Image Publications. ISBN 0-906362-13-X.
• Monaghan, Patricia. "O Mother Sun: A New View of the Cosmic Feminine." Crossing Press, 1994. ISBN 0-89594-722-6
• Ranjan Kumar Singh. Surya: The God and His Abode. Parijat. ISBN 81-903561-7-8

External links

• The Worship of the Sun Among the Aryan Peoples of Antiquity by Sir James G. Frazer (from archive.org)
• The Sun God Ra and Ancient Egypt
• The Sun God and the Wind Deity at Kizil by Tianshu Zhu, in Transoxiana Eran ud Aneran, Webfestschrift Marshak 2003.
• Comparison between the Egyptian Hymn of Aten and modern scientific conceptions

( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_deity )

The warrior goddess Sekhmet, shown with her sun disk and cobra crown

Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth

( http://www.ain23.com/topy.net/ )


Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth or TOPY was a fellowship founded in 1981^[1] by members of Psychic TV, Coil, Current 93, and a number of other individuals.^[2] The network was a loosely federated group of people operating as a blend of artistic collective and practitioners of magic.

Contents 1 Creation and influence 2 Theory and praxis 3 Schisms 4 Key texts 5 References 6 External links Creation and influence The early network consisted of a number of 'stations' worldwide including TOPY-CHAOS for Australia, TOPYNA for North America and TOPY Station 23 for the United Kingdom and Europe. Smaller, "grass-roots"-level sub-stations called Access Points were located throughout America and Europe.[3] Throughout its existence, TOPY has been an influential group in the underground chaos magic scene[4] and in the wider western occult tradition.[5] Theory and praxis TOPY is dedicated to the manifestation of magical concepts lacking mysticism or the worship of gods. The group focuses on the psychic and magical aspects of the human brain linked with "guiltless sexuality". TOPY's research has covered both left hand and right hand ritual magic and elements of psychology, art and music. Brion Gysin, the Process Church of the Final Judgement, William S. Burroughs, Aleister Crowley and Austin Osman Spare stand out as major influences. On the 23rd hour (11:00pm) of the 23rd day of each month TOPY members were encouraged to make magical sigils. If an individual chose to do so, they were invited to mail their sigils to a central location where the magical energy in them could be used to enhance others.[4] The reason for the use of "TOPY cant", such as the spelling of "thee" and "ov" in the network's name, derives from the writings of Genesis P-Orridge, which advocate a deconstruction of "normal" or consensus modes of communication in order to achieve a more integrated understanding of the Self. Schisms In the early 1990s a "rift" occurred within the network when Genesis P-Orridge of Psychic TV, one of the few founding members still involved at that time, and probably the most famous public face of TOPY during the 1980s, announced his departure from the organization. This was later exacerbated when he later claimed that he had shut down the network upon his leaving. The remaining members of the network chose not to go along with this and carried on with their activities. TOPY continued to grow and evolve throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century while Genesis P-Orridge moved on to other projects such as The Process, as well as a similar project to TOPY called Topi. In 2008, TOPY underwent its biggest change as it evolved into the Autonomous Individuals Network (AIN). The new organisation was built on the foundations of the TOPY network and "all the history and knowledge that community has gathered since its creation in the 1980s".[6] In December, 2010, Genesis P-Orridge activated the One True Topi Tribe, a reactivation of sorts of the original Temple Ov Psychick Youth, this time with focus on creating an intentional artists community. Key texts There have been a number of texts produced by Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth to expound its philosophies. Some of the key texts produced over the years have been: Nexis Thee Sigilizers Handbook Thee Grey Book[7] (which was important during the 1980s but is no longer distributed by TOPY) Thee Black Book[8] Broadcast (the journal of TOPY) Thee Psychick Bible is a culmination of all past copies of TOPY literature, as well as containing updates and personal additions by Genesis P-Orridge References ^ chaosmatrix.org copy of email(?) "TOPY ON-LINE TRANSMISSION 1.06", dated 23 June 1991 ^ Keenan, David; England's Hidden Reverse, SAF Publishing Ltd, 2003 ^ An Introduction to Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth. Brighton, Sussex, UK: Temple Press Limited, 1989 ^ a b Greer, John Michael; New Encyclopedia of the Occult, Llewellyn Publications, 2005 ^ Burton, Tina. "Intuitive Magick?": A Study of the Temple ov Psy-chick Youth, 1981-1989. Unpublished paper in the American Religions Collection, Davidson Library, University of California—Santa Barbara, 1989 ^ as stated on the Autonomous Individuals Network official site ^ "bob's been really crazy lately". Kondole.com. http://www.kondole.com/theegreybook/greycover.htm. Retrieved 18 March 2012. ^ "bob's been really crazy lately". Kondole.com. http://www.kondole.com/theesigilsbook/black0.html. Retrieved 18 March 2012. External links TOPY website One True Topi Tribe Genesis P Orridge Statement Of Termination ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thee_Temple_ov_Psychick_Youth ) ( http://www.amazon.com/THEE-PSYCHICK-BIBLE-Apocryphal-Scriptures/dp/1932595902 )

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Title page, first English-language edition, 1922
Author(s)	Ludwig Wittgenstein
Original title	Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung
Translator	Original English translation byFrank P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden
Country	Germany
Language	German
Subject(s)	Philosophy of language, logic
Publisher	First published in Wilhelm Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie
Publication date	1921
Published in English	Kegan Paul, 1922
Pages	75

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Latin for "Logical-Philosophical Treatise") is the only book-length philosophical work published by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in his lifetime. It was an ambitious project: to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of science.^[1] It is recognized as a significant philosophical work of the twentieth century. G. E. Moore originally suggested the work's Latin title as homage to Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza.^[2]
Wittgenstein wrote the notes for Tractatus while he was a soldier during World War I and completed it when a prisoner of war at Como and later Cassino in August 1918.^[3] It was first published in German in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. Tractatus was influential chiefly amongst the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, such as Rudolf Carnap and Friedrich Waismann. Bertrand Russell's article "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" is presented as a working out of ideas that he had learnt from Wittgenstein.^[4]
Tractatus employs a notoriously austere and succinct literary style. The work contains almost no arguments as such, but, rather, consists of declarative statements which are meant to be self-evident. The statements are hierarchically numbered, with seven basic propositions at the primary level (numbered 1–7), with each sub-level being a comment on or elaboration of the statement at the next higher level (e.g., 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.12).
Wittgenstein's later works, notably the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, criticised many of the ideas in Tractatus.

Contents

1 Main theses 1.1 Proposition 1 1.2 Propositions 2. & 3. 1.3 Propositions 4.*-5.* 1.4 Proposition 6.* 1.5 Proposition 7 1.6 The Picture Theory 1.7 Logical Atomism 1.8 The Saying/Showing Distinction 2 Reception and influence 3 Editions 4 Notes 5 References 6 External links Main theses There are seven main propositions in the text. These are: The world is everything that is the case. What is the case (a fact) is the existence of states of affairs. A logical picture of facts is a thought. A thought is a proposition with a sense. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) The general form of a proposition is the general form of a truth function, which is: . This is the general form of a proposition. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Proposition 1 The first chapter is very brief: 1 The world is all that is the case. 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts. 1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case. 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 1.2 The world divides into facts. 1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same. This along with the beginning of two can be taken to be the relevant parts of Wittgenstein's metaphysical view that he will use to support his picture theory of language. Propositions 2. & 3. These sections concern Wittgenstein's view that the sensible, changing world we perceive does not consist of substance but of facts. Proposition two begins with a discussion of objects, form and substance. 2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs. 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). This epistemic notion is further clarified by a discussion of objects or things as metaphysical substances. 2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object. 2.02 Objects are simple. ... 2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. His use of 'composite' in 2.021 can be taken to mean a combination of form and matter, in the Platonic sense. The notion of a static unchanging Form and its identity with Substance represents the metaphysical view that has come to be held as an assumption by the vast majority of the Western philosophical tradition since Plato and Aristotle, as it was something they agreed on. “…what is called a form or a substance is not generated.” [5] (Z.8 1033b13) The opposing view states that unalterable Form, does not exist, or at least if there is such a thing, it contains an ever changing, relative substance in a constant state of flux. Although this view was held by Greeks like Heraclitus, it has existed only on the fringe of the Western tradition since then. It is commonly known now only in "Eastern" metaphysical views where the primary concept of substance is Qi, or something similar, which persists through and beyond any given Form. The former view is shown to be held by Wittgenstein in what follows... 2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case. 2.025 It is form and content. ... 2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. 2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the substantial are one and the same. 2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and substantial; their configuration is what is changing and unstable. Although Wittgenstein largely disregarded Aristotle (Ray Monk's biography suggests that he never read Aristotle at all) it seems that they shared some anti-Platonist views on the universal/particular issue regarding primary substances. He attacks universals explicitly in his Blue Book. "The idea of a general concept being a common property of its particular instances connects up with other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language. It is comparable to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties; e.g. that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful things as alcohol is of beer and wine, and that we therefore could have pure beauty, unadulterated by anything that is beautiful."[6] And Aristotle agrees... "The universal cannot be a substance in the manner in which an essence is…" [5] (Z.13 1038b17) as he begins to draw the line and drift away from the concepts of universal Forms held by his teacher Plato. The concept of Essence, taken alone is a potentiality, and its combination with matter is its actuality. “First, the substance of a thing is peculiar to it and does not belong to any other thing.” [5] (Z.13 1038b10), i.e. not universal and we know this is essence. This concept of form/substance/essence, which we've now collapsed into one, being presented as potential is also held by Wittgenstein, apparently... 2.033 Form is the possibility of structure. 2.034 The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs. 2.04 The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. ... 2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world. Here ends what Wittgenstein deems to be the relevant points of his metaphysical view and he begins in 2.1 to use said view to support his Picture Theory of Language. "The Tractatus's notion of substance is the modal analogue of Kant's temporal notion. Whereas for Kant, substance is that which “persists,” (i.e., exists at all times), for Wittgenstein it is that which, figuratively speaking, “persists” through a “space” of possible worlds." [7] Whether the Aristotelian notions of substance came to Wittgenstein via Immanuel Kant or Bertrand Russell or even arrived at intuitively, one cannot but see them. The further thesis of 2. & 3. and their subsidiary propositions is Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language. This can be summed up as follows: The world consists of a totality of interconnected atomic facts, and propositions make "pictures" of the world. In order for a picture to represent a certain fact it must in some way possess the same logical structure as the fact. The picture is a standard of reality. In this way, linguistic expression can be seen as a form of geometric projection, where language is the changing form of projection but the logical structure of the expression is the unchanging geometric relationships. We cannot say with language what is common in the structures, rather it must be shown, because any language we use will also rely on this relationship, and so we cannot step out of our language with language. Propositions 4.*-5.* The 4s are significant as they contain some of Wittgenstein's most explicit statements concerning the nature of philosophy and the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. It is here, for instance, that he first distinguishes between material and grammatical propositions, noting: 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all. A philosophical treatise attempts to say something where nothing can properly be said. It is predicated upon the idea that philosophy should be pursued in a way analogous to the natural sciences; that philosophers are looking to construct true theories. This sense of philosophy does not coincide with Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. 4.1 Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences). 4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word "philosophy" must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.) 4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. ... 4.113 Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science. 4.114 It must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought. 4.115 It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said. Wittgenstein is to be credited with the invention or at least the popularization of truth tables (4.31) and truth conditions (4.431) which now constitute the standard semantic analysis of first-order sentential logic.[8][9] The philosophical significance of such a method for Wittgenstein was that it alleviated a confusion, namely the idea that logical inferences are justified by rules. If an argument form is valid, the conjunction of the premises will be logically equivalent to the conclusion and this can be clearly seen in a truth table; it is displayed. The concept of tautology is thus central to Wittgenstein's Tractarian account of logical consequence, which is strictly deductive. 5.13 When the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, we can see this from the structure of the propositions. 5.131 If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another: nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them, by combining them with one another in a single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are internal, and their existence is an immediate result of the existence of the propositions. ... 5.132 If p follows from q, I can make an inference from q to p, deduce p from q. The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible justification of the inference. "Laws of inference", which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous. Proposition 6.* In the beginning of 6. Wittgenstein postulates the essential form of all sentences. He uses the notation , where stands for all atomic propositions, stands for any subset of propositions, and stands for the negation of all propositions making up . What proposition 6. really says is that any logical sentence can be derived from a series of nand operations on the totality of atomic propositions. This is in fact a well-known logical theorem produced by Henry M. Sheffer, of which Wittgenstein makes use. Sheffer's result was, however, restricted to the propositional calculus, and so, of limited significance. Wittgenstein's N-operator is however an infinitary analogue of the Sheffer stroke, which applied to a set of propositions produces a proposition that is equivalent to the denial of every member of that set. Wittgenstein shows that this operator can cope with the whole of predicate logic with identity, defining the quantifiers at 5.52, and showing how identity would then be handled at 5.53-5.532. The subsidiaries of 6. contain more philosophical reflections on logic, connecting to ideas of knowledge, thought, and the a priori and transcendental. The final passages argue that logic and mathematics express only tautologies and are transcendental, i.e. they lie outside of the metaphysical subject’s world. In turn, a logically "ideal" language cannot supply meaning, it can only reflect the world, and so, sentences in a logical language cannot remain meaningful if they are not merely reflections of the facts. In the final pages Wittgenstein veers towards what might be seen as religious considerations. This is founded on the gap between propositions 6.5 and 6.4. A logical positivist might accept the propositions of Tractatus before 6.4. But 6.51 and the succeeding propositions argue that ethics is also transcendental, and thus we cannot examine it with language, as it is a form of aesthetics and cannot be expressed. He begins talking of the will, life after death, and God. In his examination of these issues he argues that all discussion of them is a misuse of logic. Specifically, since logical language can only reflect the world, any discussion of the mystical, that which lies outside of the metaphysical subject's world, is meaningless. This suggests that many of the traditional domains of philosophy, e.g. ethics and metaphysics, cannot in fact be discussed meaningfully. Any attempt to discuss them immediately loses all sense. This also suggests that his own project of trying to explain language is impossible for exactly these reasons. He suggests that the project of philosophy must ultimately be abandoned for those logical practices which attempt to reflect the world, not what is outside of it. The natural sciences are just such a practice, he suggests. At the very end of the text he borrows an analogy from Arthur Schopenhauer, and compares the book to a ladder that must be thrown away after one has climbed it. Proposition 7 As the last line in the book, proposition 7 has no supplementary propositions. It ends the book with a rather elegant and stirring proposition: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." („Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.“) Both the first and the final proposition have acquired something of a proverbial quality in German, employed as aphorisms independently of discussion of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's conclusion in Proposition 7 echoes the Old Testament words of Jesus ben Sirach (ישוע בן סירא, Yešwaʿ ven Siraʾ): What is too sublime for you, do not seek; do not reach into things that are hidden from you. What is committed to you, pay heed to; what is hidden is not your concern. (Sirach 3: 21-22). Saint Thomas Aquinas addressed ben Sirach--and, by extension, Wittgenstein--in the First Article, First Part, of his Summa Theologica: I answer that, it was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee (Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God such as reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revaluation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas as man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science built up by reason there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.[10] Following Aquinas, moral philosophers and theologians have addressed the problem of religious language for centuries. Moreover, there has been extensive commentary on the relationship between the respective treatises of Wittgenstein (Tractatus) and Aquinas (Summa Theologica).[11][12] In addition, Fergus Gordon Kerr, a Roman Catholic priest of the Order of Preachers founded by Saint Dominic, notes that "theological questions lie between the lines of all of Wittgenstein's writing. It is hard to think of a great philosopher, at least since Nietzsche, whose work is equally pervaded by theological considerations."[13] The Picture Theory A prominent view set out in the Tractatus is the picture theory. The picture theory is a proposed description of the relation of representation.[14] This view is sometimes called the picture theory of language, but Wittgenstein discusses various representational picturing relationships, including non-linguistic "pictures" such as photographs and sculptures (TLP 2.1–2.225).[14] According to the theory, propositions can "picture" the world, and thus accurately represent it.[14] If someone thinks the proposition, "There is a tree in the yard," then that proposition accurately pictures the world if and only if there is a tree in the yard.[15] If there is no tree in the yard, the proposition does not accurately picture the world. Although something need not be a proposition to represent something in the world, Wittgenstein was largely concerned with the way propositions function as representations.[14] Wittgenstein was inspired for this theory by the way that traffic courts in Paris reenact automobile accidents.[16] A toy car is a representation of a real car, a toy truck is a representation of a real truck, and dolls are representations of people. In order to convey to a judge what happened in an automobile accident, someone in the courtroom might place the toy cars in a position like the position the real cars were in, and move them in the ways that the real cars moved. In this way, the elements of the picture (the toy cars) are in spatial relation to one another, and this relation itself pictures the spatial relation between the real cars in the automobile accident.[17] When writing about these picturing situations, Wittgenstein used the word "Bild," which may be translated as "picture" or "model". Although the theory is commonly known as the "picture" theory, "model" is probably a more appropriate way of thinking of what Wittgenstein meant by "Bild."[16] Pictures have what Wittgenstein calls Form der Abbildung, or pictorial form, in virtue of their being similar to what they picture. The fact that the toy car has four wheels, for example, is part of its pictorial form, because the real car had four wheels. The fact that the toy car is significantly smaller than the real car is part of its representational form, or the differences between the picture and what it pictures, which Wittgenstein is interpreted to mean by Form der Darstellung.[18] This picturing relationship, Wittgenstein believed, was our key to understanding the relationship a proposition holds to the world.[14] We can't see a proposition like we can a toy car, yet he believed a proposition must still have a pictorial form.[19] The pictorial form of a proposition is best captured in the pictorial form of a thought, as thoughts consist only of pictorial form. This pictorial form is logical structure.[20] Wittgenstein believed that the parts of the logical structure of thought must somehow correspond to words as parts of the logical structure of propositions, although he did not know exactly how.[21] Here, Wittgenstein ran into a problem he acknowledged widely: we cannot think about a picture outside of its representational form.[20] Recall that part of the representational form of toy cars is their size—specifically, the fact that they are necessarily smaller than the actual cars.[18] Just so, a picture cannot express its own pictorial form.[20] One outcome of the picture theory is that a priori truth does not exist. Truth comes from the accurate representation of a state of affairs (i.e., some aspect of the real world) by a picture (i.e., a proposition). "The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world (TLP 3.01)." Thus without holding a proposition up against the real world, we cannot tell whether the proposition is true or false.[20] Logical Atomism Although Wittgenstein did not use the term himself, his metaphysical view throughout the Tractatus is commonly referred to as logical atomism. While his logical atomism resembles that of Bertrand Russell, the two views are not strictly the same.[22] Russell's theory of descriptions is a way of logically analyzing objects in a meaningful way regardless of that object's existence. According to the theory, a statement like "There is a man to my left" is made meaningful by analyzing it into: "There is some x such that x is a man and x is to my left, and for any y, if y is a man and y is to my left, y is identical to x". If the statement is true, x refers to the man to my left.[23] Whereas Russell believed the names (like x) in his theory should refer to things we can know epistemically, Wittgenstein thought they should refer to the "objects" that make up his metaphysics.[24] By objects, Wittgenstein did not mean physical objects in the world, but the absolute base of logical analysis, that can be combined but not divided (TLP 2.02–2.0201).[22] According to Wittgenstein's logical-atomistic metaphysical system, objects each have a "nature," which is their capacity to combine with other objects. When combined, objects form "states of affairs." A state of affairs that obtains is a "fact." Facts make up the entirety of the world. Facts are logically independent of one another, as are states of affairs. That is, one state of affair's (or fact's) existence does not allow us to infer whether another state of affairs (or fact) exists or does not exist.[25] Within states of affairs, objects are in particular relations to one another.[26] This is analogous to the spatial relations between toy cars discussed above. The structure of states of affairs comes from the arrangement of their constituent objects (TLP 2.032), and such arrangement is essential to their intelligibility, just as the toy cars must be arranged in a certain way in order to picture the automobile accident.[26] A fact might be thought of as the obtaining state of affairs that Madison is in Wisconsin, and a possible (but not obtaining) state of affairs might be Madison's being in Utah. These states of affairs are made up of certain arrangements of objects (TLP 2.023). However, Wittgenstein does not specify what objects are. Madison, Wisconsin, and Utah cannot be atomic objects: they are themselves composed of numerous facts.[26] Instead, Wittgenstein believed objects to be the things in the world that would correlate to the smallest parts of a logically analyzed language, such as names like x. Our language is not sufficiently (i.e., not completely) analyzed for such a correlation, so one cannot say what an object is.[27] We can, however, talk about them as "indestructible" and "common to all possible worlds."[26] Wittgenstein believed that the philosopher's job was to discover the structure of language through analysis.[28] Anthony Kenny provides a useful analogy for understanding Wittgenstein's logical atomism: a slightly modified game of chess.[29] Just like objects in states of affairs, the chess pieces do not alone constitute the game—their arrangements, together with the pieces (objects) themselves, determine the state of affairs.[27] Through Kenny's chess analogy, we can see the relationship between Wittgenstein's logical atomism and his picture theory of representation.[30] For the sake of this analogy, the chess pieces are objects, they and their positions constitute states of affairs and therefore facts, and the totality of facts is the entire particular game of chess.[27] We can communicate such a game of chess in the exact way that Wittgenstein says a proposition represents the world.[30] We might say "WR/KR1" to communicate a white rook's being on the square commonly labeled as king's rook 1. Or, to be more thorough, we might make such a report for every piece's position.[30] The logical form of our reports must be the same logical form of the chess pieces and their arrangement on the board in order to be meaningful. Our communication about the chess game must have as many possibilities for constituents and their arrangement as the game itself.[30] Kenny points out that such logical form need not strictly resemble the chess game. The logical form can be had by the bouncing of a ball (for example, twenty bounces might communicate a white rook's being on the king's rook 1 square). One can bounce a ball as many times as one wishes, which means the ball's bouncing has "logical multiplicity," and can therefore share the logical form of the game.[31] A motionless ball cannot communicate this same information, as it does not have logical multiplicity.[30] The Saying/Showing Distinction According to the picture theory, when a proposition is thought or expressed, each of its constituent parts correspond (if the proposition is true) to some aspect of the world. However, the correspondence itself is something Wittgenstein believed we could not say anything about. We can say that there is correspondence, but the correspondence itself can only be shown.[32] His logical-atomistic metaphysical view led Wittgenstein to believe that we could not say anything about the relationship that pictures bear to what they picture. Thus the picture theory allows us to be shown that some things can be said while others are shown.[33] Our language is not sufficient for expressing its own logical structure.[34] Wittgenstein believed that the philosopher's job was to discover the structure of language through analysis.[28] Something sayable must have content that is fully intelligible to a person without that person's knowing if it is true or false.[15] In the case of something's inability to be said, such as the logical structure of language, it can only be shown.[20] A proposition can say something, such as "George is tall," but it cannot express (say) this function of itself. It can only show that it says that George is tall.[15] Reception and influence Wittgenstein concluded that with the Tractatus he had resolved all philosophical problems. Meanwhile, the book was translated into English by C. K. Ogden with help from the Cambridge mathematician and philosopher Frank P. Ramsey, then still in his teens. Ramsey later visited Wittgenstein in Austria. Translation issues make the concepts hard to pinpoint, especially given Wittgenstein's usage of terms and difficulty in translating ideas into words.[35] The Tractatus caught the attention of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle (1921–1933), especially Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. The group spent many months working through the text out loud, line by line. Schlick eventually convinced Wittgenstein to meet with members of the circle to discuss the Tractatus when he returned to Vienna (he was then working as an architect). Although the Vienna Circle's logical positivists appreciated the Tractatus, they argued that the last few passages, including Proposition 7, are confused. Carnap hailed the book as containing important insights, but encouraged people to ignore the concluding sentences. Wittgenstein responded to Schlick, commenting, "...I cannot imagine that Carnap should have so completely misunderstood the last sentences of the book and hence the fundamental conception of the entire book."[36] A more recent interpretation comes from the New Wittgenstein family of interpretations (2000-).[37] This so-called "resolute reading" is controversial and much debated.[citation needed] The main contention of such readings is that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus does not provide a theoretical account of language that relegates ethics and philosophy to a mystical realm of the unsayable. Rather, the book has a therapeutic aim. By working through the propositions of the book the reader comes to realize that language is perfectly suited to all his needs, and that philosophy rests on a confused relation to the logic of our language. The confusion that the Tractatus seeks to dispel is not a confused theory, such that a correct theory would be a proper way to clear the confusion, rather the need of any such theory is confused. The method of the Tractatus is to make the reader aware of the logic of our language as he is already familiar with it, and the effect of thereby dispelling the need for a theoretical account of the logic of our language spreads to all other areas of philosophy. Thereby the confusion involved in putting forward e.g. ethical and metaphysical theories is cleared in the same coup. Wittgenstein would not meet the Vienna Circle proper, but only a few of its members, including Schlick, Carnap, and Waissman. Often, though, he refused to discuss philosophy, and would insist on giving the meetings over to reciting the poetry of Rabindranath Tagore with his chair turned to the wall. He largely broke off formal relations even with these members of the circle after coming to believe Carnap had used some of his ideas without permission.[38] The Tractatus was the theme of a 1992 film by the Hungarian filmmaker Peter Forgacs. The 32-minute production, named Wittgenstein Tractatus, features citations from the Tractatus and other works by Wittgenstein. Editions Tractatus is the English translation of Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, Wilhelm Ostwald (ed.), Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 14 (1921) A notable German Edition of the works of Wittgenstein is: Werkausgabe (Vol. 1 includes Tractatus). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. Both English translations of Tractatus include an introduction by Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein revised the Ogden translation.[39] C. K. Ogden (1922), prepared with assistance from G. E. Moore, F. P. Ramsey, and Wittgenstein. Routledge & Kegan Paul, parallel edition including the German text on the facing page to the English text: 1981 printing: ISBN 0-415-05186-X, 1999 Dover reprint David Pears and Brian McGuinness (1961), Routledge, hardcover: ISBN 0-7100-3004-5, 1974 paperback: ISBN 0-415-02825-6, 2001 hardcover: ISBN 0-415-25562-7, 2001 paperback: ISBN 0-415-25408-6 A manuscript version of Tractatus, dubbed and published as the Prototractatus, was discovered in 1965 by Georg Henrik von Wright.[39] Notes ^ TLP 4.113 ^ Nils-Eric Sahlin, The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey (1990), p. 227. ^ Monk p.158 ^ Bertrand Russell (1918), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism". The Monist. p. 177, as published, for example in Bertrand Russell (Robert Charles Marsh ed.) Logic and Knowledge Accessed 2010-01-29. ^ a b c Aristotle's Metaphysics: © 1979 by H.G. Apostle Peripatetic Press. Des Moines, Iowa. Online translation: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.7.vii.html ^ "Blue Book on Universals citation". Blacksacademy.net. http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/2975.html. Retrieved 2011-12-10.  ^ "Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-atomism/#1. Retrieved 2011-12-10.  ^ Grayling, A.C. Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford ^ Kneale, M. & Kneale, W. (1962), The Development of Logic ^ "Summa Theologia". Christian Classics Ethereal Library. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q1_A1.html. Retrieved 14MAY12. "See the First Part, Question 1, Article 1."  ^ Stout, Jeremy & McSwain, Robert; Editors (2004), Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein, London: SCM Press, pp. xvi + 286, ISBN 0-334-02923-6, "This book is a collection of essays on Aquinas and Wittgenstein written by some of the leading theologians and philosophers of religion in the English-speaking world."  ^ Hallett, Garth L.; Society of Jesus (2004), Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith: Late-Wittgensteinian Perspectives, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, pp. ix + 211, ISBN 0-754-65034-0, "This book presents the first sustained study of the identities that run through the heart of Christian faith and theology: the identity of Jesus with God, of each of the three divine persons with God, of the Eucharist with the body and blood of Christ, of present teaching with traditional teaching and of traditional teaching with revelation, of the present church with the church of the Apostles, of the risen Christ with the crucified Christ, and of the blessed with the deceased. Resisting essentialism and stressing Wittgensteinian analogy, Hallett makes due room for mystery. By locating rather than explaining the mystery he throws new light on each of the identities studied."  ^ Kerr, Fergus; Order of Preachers (1986), Theology after Wittgenstein, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. xii + 202, ISBN 0-631-14688-1, "The philosopher Wittgenstein is considered by many to be the most influential and significant of the 20th century. This book introduces him to students of theology and focuses on his writings dealing with theological issues such as the inner life, immortality of the soul, and the relationship of the believer to church and tradition."  ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005, p. 44 ^ a b c Kenny 2005, p. 53 ^ a b Stern 1995, p. 35 ^ Kenny 2005, p. 45 ^ a b Kenny 2005, p. 46 ^ Kenny 2005, p. 47 ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005, p. 48 ^ Kenny 2005, p. 47 Might need an additional citation here. ^ a b Kenny 2005, p. 58 ^ "Descriptions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/#RusTheDes. Retrieved 2011-12-10.  ^ Kenny 2005, p. 63 ^ Kenny 2005, pp. 58–59 ^ a b c d Kenny 2005, p. 59 ^ a b c Kenny 2005, p. 60 ^ a b Stern 1995, p. 38 ^ Kenny 2005, pp. 60–61 ^ a b c d e Kenny 2005, p. 61 ^ Kenny 2005, p. 62 ^ Kenny 2005, p. 56 ^ Stern 1995, p. 40 ^ Stern 1995, p. 47 ^ Richard H. Popkin (November 1985), "Philosophy and the History of Philosophy", Journal of Philosophy 82 (11): 625–632, doi:10.2307/2026418, JSTOR 2026418, "Many who knew Wittgenstein report that he found it extremely difficult to put his ideas into words and that he had many special usages of terms."  ^ Conant, James F. "Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their Works as Authors", in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief (1995), ed. Timothy Tessin and Marion von der Ruhr, St. Martins Press, ISBN 0-312-12394-9 ^ Crary, Alice M. and Rupert Read (eds.). The New Wittgenstein, Routledge, 2000. ^ Hintikka 2000, p. 55 cites Wittgenstein's accusation of Carnap upon receiving a 1932 preprint from Carnap. ^ a b R. W. Newell (January 1973), "Reviewed Work(s): Prototractatus, an Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", Philosophy 48 (183): 97–99, ISSN 0031-8191, JSTOR 3749717. References Hintikka, Jaakko (2000), On Wittgenstein, ISBN 0-534-57594-3  Kenny, Anthony (2005), Wittgenstein, Williston, VT: Wiley-Blackwell . Stern, David G. (1995), Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press  Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Duty of Genius, Jonathan Cape, 1990. External links English versions online Umass.edu, (Contains German, and Ogden and Pears & McGuinness translations Side-by-Side-by-Side) Gutenberg.org (Ogden translation) TractatusLogico-Phlosophicus (As a hierarchically nested document) Philosurfical.open.ac.uk Research software tool aimed at facilitating the study of Tractatus. The text is available in German and in both English translations (Ogden & Pears-McGuinness) Graphical tabs-centered version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (based on Pears & McGuinness translation) Audiobook version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation) Tree-like version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation) German version online Tractatus-Online.appspot.com Hochholzer.info Tractatus.Net KFS.org (Ogden translation (incomplete) Philosurfical.open.ac.uk Wikipedia Article Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tractatus_Logico-Philosophicus 3.0321 Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot.